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0O0
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
0O0
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Workman's Compensation case involving the claim of
a dependent spouse.

Mrs. Dahl, the wife of the deceased and

Plaintiff-Appellant in this case, had filed a claim for
dependent's benefits as a surviving spouse on December 12, 1985.
On September 3, 1985, the Industrial Commission denied her claim
and entered a Death Benefits Order finding there were no dependents of the deceased at the time of his death.

This appeal

involves the Industrial Commission's denial of that claim.

The

case was tried before the Honorable Timothy C. Allen,
Administrative Law Judge.

The Findings oi Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Order denying Mrs. Dahl's claim were entered on March

17, 1986.

Thereafter, Mrs. Dahl timely filed a Motion to Review

Order of Administrative Law Judge on March 26, 1986.

This Motion

was denied by the Industrial Commission on May 21, 1986.

She

then timely filed her Petition for Review in the Supreme Court of
Utah on June 19, 1986.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marital History

Cynthia Zoe Dahl and Steven Bradley Dahl were married on
October 22, 1976 [R.31].

Mr. Dahl's employment with Revlon

brought them to Utah in September of 1979, and they jointly
purchased a home in Sandy [R.32] at 1151 South Hidden Valley
Boulevard [R.30].

Both signed the loan documents as joint

obligors [R.166].

In November of 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Dahl sep-

arated.

As a result of her employment with Frontier Airlines,

Mrs. Dahl temporarily left Salt Lake City and went to Denver,
Colorado [R.37], taking only daily necessities with her and
leaving her car and all other personal belongings at the parties1
home in Sandy [R.38].

Mr. Dahl remained in Sandy in the marital

residence, operating his business out of their home.
Mrs. Dahl believed this separation was only temporary and
that the parties merely needed some time to work things out
[R.37].

During this period, the parties maintained telephone

contact [R.39] and saw one another whenever Mr. Dahl traveled to
Denver [R.39].

However, in January, 1985, Mr. Dahl initiated
2

uivorce proceedings [R.39].

In lieu of a temporary support

order, it was agreed between counsel for the parties that Mr.
Dahl would assume the mortgage payments on the parties1 residence
in Sandy and make the payments on the parties1 indebtedness of
approximately $7,000.00 [R.40, 70]. On July 23, 1985, at the
insistence of Mr. Dahl, Mrs. Dahl signed a Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement prepared by Mr. Dahl's attorney,
Frederick Green [R.40-43].

At no point did she discuss the

signing of the Stipulation with her attorney, Mr. Paul Liapis.
Mr. Liapis did not sign the agreement, although the agreement was
prepared for his signature, as well as the parties and other
counsel.

The partially executed Settlement Agreement was filed

on August 5, 1985, three days after Mr. Dahl's death by Frederick
Green, counsel for Mr. Dahl.

It provided, among other things,

that Mr. Dahl would assume and pay the mortgage balance owed on
the residence and hold Mrs. Dahl harmless.

(A copy of this

Agreement has been included in the Addendum to this Brief, marked
Exhibit "A.")
On August 2, 1985, Mr. Dahl was killed in a commercial
airplane accident when he was travelling for his employer,
Revlon, Inc.

The parties were still married at that time; there

had not been a divorce trial or hearing; no testimony had been
given by either party relating to the allegations of the
Complaint; and no Decree of Divorce had been entered [R.43].
Later, in November of 1985, Mrs. Dahl moved back into the
family home and attempted to make monthly payments on the
3

mortgage.

At the time of the hearing, her net salary was approx-

imately $1,200.00 per month [R.51].

The mortgage payment on the

Sandy residence alone is $800.00 per month [R.44].

Mrs. Dahl's

salary is insufficient to meet her obligations or support herself
commensurate with the standard of living established by the
parties during the marriage and pay the obligations her husband
had agreed to pay [R.42-44].
On September 3, 19 85, the Industrial Commission entered a
Death Benefits Order finding that there were no dependents of the
deceased at the time of his death and that the sum of $30,000.00
should be paid into the Default Indemnity Fund [R.2].

(A copy of

that Order has been included in the Addendum to this Brief,
marked Exhibit "B.")
On December 12, 1985, Mrs. Dahl filed an Application for
Death Benefits with the Industrial Commission for death benefits
as the surviving dependent spouse of Mr. Dahl [R.9].

At a

hearing on that Application the Administrative Law Judge found
that Mr. Dahl was neither living with Mrs. Dahl at the time of
his death, nor was he supporting her and affirmed the Commissioner's
Order of September 3, 1985, denying Mrs. Dahl Dependent Death
Benefits and dismissed her claim with prejudice [R.175-181].

(A

copy of those Findings and Conclusions have been included in the
Addendum to this Brief, marked Exhibit " C " )

The Industrial

Commission then denied Mrs. Dahl's Motion to Review the
Administrative Law Judge's decision on May 21, 1986 [R.192-195].
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(A copy of that Order of Denial has been included in the Addendum
to this Brief, marked Exhibit "D.")

Framing of Dependency Standard

At the March 12, 1986, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
wanted to consider only whether or not the parties were married
at the time of Mr. Dahl's death and not Mr. and Mrs. Dahlfs
accustomed standard of living at the time of Mr. Dahlrs death for
purposes of determining dependency under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

That position was made apparent when Mr.

Gustin, Mrs. Dahl's attorney, offered the parties1 1985 tax
returns as evidence and the following interchange occurred.
f

MS. PIXTON: We have no objection to the
85 return, Your Honor. It shows her income.

MR. GUSTIN: It shows her income, and it
shows his income up until August.
It establishes the standard of living to
which she was accustomed to, in terms of the
financial wherewithall of the two parties.
THE COURT:

But that's not an issue.

MR. GUSTIN: Well, the issue is dependency. And I think dependency is directly
related to financial standard of living. At
least according to the cases that we have,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: I think the issue is not
dependency. The issue is was she still
married to the deceased on the date of his
death.
MR. GUSTIN: Well, I think that's
established, Your Honor. That she was still
5

raarried. But the statute talks to the
question of-THE COURT: Well, I don't believe it. I
take issue with that. I'm not convinced that
that's established. Okay? No. 1, because
the statute says, you know, the legal spouse.
Right?
MR. GUSTIN:

That's correct.

THE COURT: But the statute also says
"living with the deceased at the time of
death."
MR. GUSTIN:

That correct.

THE COURT: Her testimony has been she
was living in Aurora on August 2nd.
MR. GUSTIN:

That's correct.

But the statute also says that if she is
not living with the deceased at the time of
the death, then the question of dependency is
a question of fact to be determined by the
Hearing Examiner.
THE COURT:
still married.
MR. GUSTIN:

If we determine that she was
Correct.

THE COURT: Because if she is not
legally married, then the case law won't
support an award. Right?
MR. GUSTIN:

Yes.

Well, we have proof here, and I think
there is no question of fact here, as to the
fact that there was no divorce entered in
this matter.
(To Ms. Pixton.) I think Counsel will
stipulate to that fact, will you not?
MS. PIXTON:

Yes.

MR. GUSTIN: So there is no divorce that
was ever entered.
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MS. PIXTON: I think the question
strictly is dependency. Ifm satisfied that
there is technically a legal marriage.
Because there is no Decree entered into
District Court file with regard to separation
or divorce. I think it's strictly a dependency claim.
THE COURT: All right [R.47-49].
(Emphasis added.)
In spite of this explanation, the Administrative Law Judge
failed to consider the evidence presented which related to Mr.
Dahl's income and the standard of living the parties were enjoying
at the time of Mr. Dahl's death [R.179], and the fact that Mr.
Dahl had agreed to assume several significant marital obligations, including the home mortgage [R.39-40 and 166-167].

Exclusion of Mrs. Dahl's Current Financial
Condition as a Direct Result of Mr. Dahl's Death
The Administrative Law Judge also erroneously excluded
evidence pertaining to Mrs. Dahl's current financial condition
which resulted directly from Mr. Dahl's death.

The first area of

evidence excluded pertained to the mortgage payments on the
couple's Sandy home.
[MR. GUSTIN] Q After his death,
what did you do with reference to the family
home in Sandy?
A
I moved back into the family home
in November of '85.
Q
it not?
A

And it's your primary residence, is
Yes.
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Q
And you1re attempting to meet the
mortgage payments on that house?
A

Yes,

Q

Are you able to do that?

A

No.

Q
Do you know how many months you're
in arrears with reference to the payment of
the mortgage on that property?
A

How many months?

Q
Yes.
in arrears?
A

Or the total amount that is

It's approximately $5,000.00.

Q
Have you been threatened by the
mortgage holder to foreclose on the mortgage?
A

Yes, I have.

Q
And do you know to what extent the
$7,000.00 worth of debts that are referred to
in this Agreement were paid?
A

No.

Q
You haven't been furnished with an
inventory of the estate?
A
Q
that is?
A

No.
You don't know what the status of
No.

Q
Immediately prior to his death he
was making the payments on the mortgage, was
he not?
A

Yes.

Q
And it was your understanding that
he would continue to make those?
A

Yes.
8

Q
Now you're suffering the additional
payment of that mortgage, as a result of his
death; is that true?
A

Yes.

Q

How much are those mortgage payments?

A

They're now $800.00 a month.

Q
And what other obligations are you
incurring with reference to the l^ouse?
MS. PIXTON: Your Honor, I'm going
to object to this line of questioning.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. GUSTIN:

Can we have a reason?

MS. PIXTON: Well, I don't think
its relevant to her condition now. I think
her condition in August of 1985 is relevant,
but her condition now has nothing to do with
it.
MR. GUSTIN: Well, I was asking
what her condition was right after his death.
THE COURT:

That wasn't the question,

Counsel.
MR. GUSTIN: Q What was your
situation at the time of his death, with
reference to the payment of those mortgages?
Did they become immediately due?
A

Yes.

MS. PIXTON: Well, I'm going to
object as to what occurred after his death.
As of August 1st, the day before the death.
1985 I think is relevant. Anything after
that I would object to, as not being relevant
as to her status of dependency [R.R.43-45].
The Administrative Law Judge sustained that objection and
excluded evidence of Mrs. Dahl's current income and its inadequacy
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in meeting obligations previously agreed to be assumed by Mr.
Dahl with their combined incomes [R.166-167].
[MR. GUSTIN] Q Was it necessary—in order to meet the financial obligations that you incurred during this marriage,
and the mortgage payments—that Mr. Dahl make
the mortgage payments and pay the debts that
had been incurred?
A

Yes.

Q
How much did you e a r n — What is
your take-home pay with Frontier Airlines
now, Mrs. Dahl?
A

Approximately $1,200.00.

Q

$1,200.00 a month?

A

Yes.

Q
And would it be fair to say that
the mortgage payments and the utility payments on the house total approximately a
thousand dollars a month?
A

Correct.

Q
There is no way that you can meet
that mortgage obligation on your income; is
that correct?
MS. PIXTON: Your Honor, I'm going
to object again. Ms. Dahl has testified that
she was not living in the house prior to the
death of Mr. Dahl.
If you want some evidence regarding what
her expenses were on August 1, I would have
no objection. Her expenses today I think are
totally irrelevant to her dependency on
August 1.
THE COURT:
Sustained [R.51-52].

Thatfs correct, Counsel,
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At the time of the hearing, as well as at the time of Mr. Dahl's
death, Mrs. Dahl was obligated to pay all mortgage payments on
the marital residence and make such other payments necessary to
preserve and maintain the home, the collateral pledged as security
on the loan and also pay the debts listed on page 3 of the
Property Settlement and Separation Agreement [R.167].

RULING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

After each side rested, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that, at the time of Steven Dahlfs death, the parties were
not living together and Steven Dahl was not supporting Cynthia
Dahl.

Therefore, the Order of September 3, 1985, denying

Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl was affirmed and her
claim was dismissed with prejudice [R.175-181].

The Industrial

Commission then affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision
in all respects [R.192-195].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
erred in denying Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl under
the Workman's Compensation Act after her husband was killed in
the course of his employment.
The Administrative Law Judge erroneously adopted a narrow
construction of the word "support" to encompass only payments
11

such as alimony or monies paid for daily necessities and not
payments related to debt assumption.

The word "support" should

have been construed more broadly to include a consideration of
what joint debts Mr. Dahl was to pay and what effect his failure
to do so would have on the lifestyle of Mrs. Dahl.

In the case

before the Court, the parties were married and Mr. Dahl was
financially responsible at the time of his death for the mortgage
payments on the couplefs home and their jointly owed obligations.
Mrs. Dahl was relying upon this financial assistance from Mr.
Dahl to maintain her standard of living, thus making her a
dependent under the provisions of Utah's Workman's Compensation
Act and entitling her to death benefits.

ARGUMENT
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ERRED IN CONCLUDING CYNTHIA DAHL WAS NOT A DEPENDENT
OF STEVEN DAHL AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH AND CONSEQUENTLY
ALSO ERRED IN DENYING HER DEPENDENT'S DEATH BENEFITS
The Administrative Law Judge should have concluded from the
evidence presented at the hearing that Mrs. Dahl was a dependent
of Mr. Dahl at the time of his death, and as such, is entitled to
dependent's benefits.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (2) (b) (iv) (1985)

provides that a surviving spouse of a deceased employee is
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year
period following the employee's death.

The statute provides:

For purposes of any dependency determination,
a surviving spouse of a deceased employee
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly
12

dependent for a six-year period from the date
of death of the employee.
Under Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d at 1200 (Utah
1984), the Utah Supreme Court determined that this statutory
provision must be read in conjunction with the limitations of
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71.

Under § 35-1-71, where a spouse is not

living with the decedent at the time of his death,
[T]he question of dependency, in whole or in part,
shall be determined in accordance with the facts
in each particular case existing at the time of
the injury or death of such employee. Id.
Because Mrs. Dahl was living in Colorado when her husband
died, her dependency is to be determined in light of all the
facts and circumstances existing at the time of Steven Dahl's
death.
This Court elaborated the requirements of this dependency
test in Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 807 (Utah
1975).

In Farnsworth, the Industrial Commission had denied

benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the father of a
deceased minor workman.

The issue on appeal was whether the

father was dependent upon his son within the meaning of
§ 31-1-71.

In interpreting this provision as requiring financial

dependency, this Court stated:
The case law of this state has consistently
limited dependency to those fact situations
wherein the deceased has contributed financial assistance or comparable assistance. . .
which was used in supporting a dependent.
Id. at 898-99.
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The Court went on to specify the requisite extent of this financial
dependency, and concluded that absolute dependency is not necessary
so long as the applicant had relied on the decedent as a means of
maintaining the standard of living to which the claimant was
accustomed.

The Court stated:

[Dependency within the terms of the statute
does not mean absolute dependency for the
necessities of life, but rather that the
applicant looked to and relied on the contributions of the workman, in whole or in
part, as a means of supporting and maintaining himself in accordance with his social
position and accustomed mode of life. Id. at
899.
Thus, the test for dependency under the Workmen's Compensation
Act requires a claimant to establish he relied, in whole or in
part, on the workman's contributions in order to maintain his
accustomed standard of living.

In the present case, the

Administrative Law Judge did not use this standard to determine
Mrs. Dahl's dependency and did not consider the Dahls' accustomed
standard of living to be relevant.
More importantly, the Administrative Law Judge narrowly
interpreted the word "support11 to mean something akin to monetary
contributions to a spouse for food and clothing only.

He disre-

garded the fact that "support" can also mean and include
agreements to pay debts for which a dependent spouse may be
obligated.
A closer reading of the file will indicate
that the Applicant, in her Stipulation did
not request any support whatsoever, in fact,
she waived alimony forever. Further, in the
Stipulation that she signed on July 23, 1985,
14

she agreed that she was not entitled to any
alimony ever. But for the death of the
deceased, the Applicant would have been
divorced from Mr. Dahl and would have been
entitled to take nothing. Therefore, it
cannot be said that Mrs. Dahl had any type of
reasonable expectation of support from the
deceased, rather, she quite clearly agreed
that she would not have any expectation of
support, by waiving her alimony, which is
support. . .
To summarize then, the Applicant and the
deceased entered into an Agreement whereby
each was to pay his own obligations and one
half of the joint and several obligations of
the parties incurred during the marriage.
For the Applicant to characterize the
Agreement as one of support, is to ignore the
obvious intent of the parties as evidenced by
their Agreement of July 23, 19 85. That
intent was that the parties were to be
divorced and Mrs. Dahl would not be entitled
to any support and neither would Mr. Dahl
[R.178-179]. (See Exhibit "C" of the Addendum
to this Brief.)
In this case, the obligation on the home was owed by both
parties and Mr. Dahl had agreed to assume that debt and others
and hold Mrs. Dahl harmless from them.

Mr. Dahl's premature

death automatically shifted all of those obligations entirely to
Mrs. Dahl - obligations she would not have had to pay if Mr. Dahl
had not been killed.
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion, the
word "support" must be more broadly interpreted to include items
in addition to direct monetary support such as alimony and in
this case, Mr. Dahl's agreement to assume certain marital
obligations clearly falls within the meaning of "support."
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The Farnsworth case goes on to cite an earlier Utah Supreme
Court decision, Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 286
P.628 (1930), as an example of this dependency test practically
applied.

In Rigby, the court held that the plaintiff, the father

of a deceased workman, had to establish that at the time of the
injury:
(1) [P]laintiff relied upon his son, in whole
or in part, for his support and maintenance;
(2) that had the son not been killed, plaintiff would in all probability have received
some assistance from his son; (3) that it was
reasonably necessary for the son to render
his father some financial aid in order that
the father might continue to live in a
condition suitable and becoming to his
station in life. Id., at 899. (Emphasis
added.)
While both Rigby and Farnsworth involve a dependent parent, the
burden of proof is the same for cases involving a dependent
spouse and "dependency" need not be strictly limited to a direct
cash contributions to the dependent person, but can also include
indirect financial contributions such as payment of debts.
Therefore, in the present case, Mrs. Dahl only had to prove
that she was wholly or partly dependent upon the contributions of
Steven Dahl at the time of his death in order to maintain her
position in life.

Mrs. Dahl clearly met her burden.

More recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of
dependency in Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, supra.

In Tuom, the

parties became married under Idaho common law in 1971 and
separated in June of 19 80 because Mr. Tuom was seeing another
woman.

Mrs. Tuom moved in with her family in Idaho, and Mr. Tuom
16

lived with the other woman in Utah.

During the fourteen-month

separation, the parties saw one another on three occasions and
maintained approximately monthly telephone contact.

In addition,

Mr. Tuom made three lump-sum payments to his wife during the
first five months of the separation.

He made no payments during

the nine months directly preceding his death.

In her appeal of

the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, this Court
determined that Mrs. Tuom must show, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-71, that the facts established she was dependent upon Mr.
Tuom at the time of his death.

The Court went on to hold that

the Industrial Commission had erred in denying benefits to Mrs.
Tuom.

In construing § 35-1-71(2), the Court concluded that,

because dependency is a question of fact,
[T]he trier of fact should consider acts
covering at least a period of one year prior
to the decedent's death in order that all
evidence bearing on dependency can be viewed
in terms of its effect over and in relation
to a significant period of time. ^d. at 1203.
Further, during this time period, the Court noted that partial
dependency does not turn upon:
[W]hether the decedent made a support payment
on the day or week or even the month of his
injury or death. . .. The benefits of this
statute are not limited to those whose
support came in a steady, even stream up to a
short time before the employee's death.
Persons whose support was paid in a lump-sum
in advance or in irregular payments should
also qualify. Id.
The Administrative Law Judge was also in error in assuming
that Mrs. Dahl had waived her right to alimony and, therefore,
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was no longer dependent on Mr. Dahl for support.
was conditional at best.

Any such waiver

The Settlement Agreement (Exhibit

"A" of the Addendum to this Brief) was subject to approval of the
Court - approval that was never given.
Section 78-45-3, Utah Code Ann, provides that:

"Every man

shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she
is in need."

Id..

This duty of support is not terminated until

the marriage is terminated through a Decree of Divorce.

No

Decree of Divorce had been entered in this case and, until such a
judicial determination occurred, Mrs. Dahl had the right to claim
support from her husband.
Further, any Settlement Agreement in a divorce action is
subject to the review and final approval of the Trial Court.
(See, Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977).)

Therefore,

since no such approval had been given, the Administrative Law
Judge was also in error when he concluded in his findings, based
upon pure speculation, that "But for the death of the deceased,
the Applicant would have been divorced and would have been
entitled to take nothing" [R.178].
In the case presently before this Court, the evidence
clearly supported a finding that Mrs. Dahl was a dependent under
the meaning of that term as used in the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

While Steven Dahl did not provide monthly support payments,

he did make major contributions to the couple's jointly-owed
obligations.

The payments toward the mortgage on their home and

towards their debts constituted support necessary to maintain
18

Cynthia Dahl's position in life and he clearly still had a duty
to support his wife, Mrs. Dahl.
As this Court stated in Farnsworth:
When. . .the established facts and inferences
reasonably deductible therefrom can lead to
but one conclusion, a question of law is
presented which this court, upon proper
application, must review. Ici. at 899.
The evidence presented to the Industrial Commission can lead to
but one conclusion.

The contributions being made by Steven Dahl

at the time of his death towards the couple's jointly-owed
obligations constitute financial support necessary for Cynthia
Dahl to maintain her accustomed manner of living.

At the time of

his death, she was, as a matter of law, his wife and a dependent
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-71 and, therefore, she is entitled to
dependent's benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
As is clearly evidenced from the comments of the
Administrative Law Judge and the content of his decision, he
simply did not understand the concept of support as it related to
a marriage which might have, but had not yet, ended in a divorce.
He first thought that no support was appropriate because the
marriage was over [R.21], even though a Decree of Divorce had not
yet been entered.
THE COURT: Because, if she is not
legally married, then the case law won't
support an award [R.49].
Secondly, he limited the definition of support only to Mrs.
Dahl's right to support, i.e., alimony, not any other financial
obligations Mr. Dahl might have to Mrs. Dahl, such as payment of
19

marital debts [R.178].

(See Exhibit "B" of the Addendum to this

Brief.)
Thirdly he was not cognizant of the law that any waiver by
Mrs. Dahl to claim alimony from her husband was at best conditional until such waiver of support and termination of Mr. Dahlfs
duty of support had been officially approved by the Court and
incorporated into a Decree of Divorce.
Individually and cumulatively, these misconceptions of the
law led the Administrative Law Judge to erroneously conclude that
Mrs. Dahl was in no way dependent upon her husband for support at
the time of his death and consequently he committed reversible
error.

CONCLUSION

The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
erred in denying Dependent's Death Benefits to Cynthia Dahl under
the Workman's Compensation Act after her husband was killed in
the course of his employment.
The Administrative Law Judge erroneously adopted the narrow
construction of the word "support" to encompass only payments
such as alimony or monies paid for daily necessities and not
payments related to debt assumption.

The word "support" should

have been construed more broadly to include a consideration of
what joint debts Mr. Dahl was paying and what effect his failure
to do so would have on the lifestyle of Mrs. Dahl.
20

In the case

before the Court, Mr. Dahl was financially responsible at the
time of his death for the mortgage payments on the couple's home
and their jointly owed debt obligations.

Mrs. Dahl relied on

this financial assistance to maintain her standard of living,
thus making her a dependent under the provisions of Utah's
Workman's Compensation Act.
This Court should reverse the Order of the Industrial
Commission affirming the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and find that Cynthia Dahl was a
dependent of Steven Dahl at the time of his death.

The Order of

September 3, 1985, awarding no death benefits, should be reversed,
and Cynthia Dahl should be awarded Dependent's Death Benefits
under Utah's Workman's Compensation Act and her costs related to
this appeal,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

y

day of November, 19 86.

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

Attorneys for PlaintLff/appellant
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL,
Plaintiff,

PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND
SEPARATION AGREEMENT

vs.
Civil NO. D-85-38
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.

The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, and has been such for a period in excess of three months
prior to the filing of the Complaint.
2.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife

having been married on the 22nd day of October, 1978, in Aurora,
Colorado.
3.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage

and none are expected.
4.

During the course of the marriage, the Defendant has

treated Plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental distress and
making it totally impossible to continue the marriage
Page - 1 -
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relat ionship.
5.

Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should

be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set aside.
6.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired an interest in a home and real property located at the
street address commonly referred to as 11551 South Hidden Valley
Boulevard, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The parties agree

that the home and real property has a current equity of
$23,214.00.

The parties agree that each party should be awarded

an interest in the home and real property equal to one-half the
equity of the parties therein after deducting the reasonable
expenses of sale and closing which the parties agree shall be
equal to seven percent (7%) of the value of the home, which, it
is aqreed by the parties, it equal to $95,500.00.

Plaintiff will

pay Defendant for her share of the equity in the home and real
property of the parties, in full, on or before the 1st day of
August, 1985.

The Defendant shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in

favor of the Plaintiff and shall be granted a recordable lien
representing her interest in the equity of the parties.

The

Plaintiff is awarded the sole custody and possession of the home
and real property of the parties subject to Defendant's interest
as set forth herein.

Plaintiff shall bear the sole and separate

responsibility for the home mortgage installments.
7. The parties aqree to pay, in equal amounts, the
following debts and obligations, in the amounts as they appeared
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as of the 20th day of December, 1984, such* that each parties'
share will be approximately $3,358.64:

- A. <-\'i

a.

VISA - Rocky Mountain

b.

Fashion Bar

c.

Nordstroms

d.

J.C. Penney

e.

Weinstocks

f.

BON

g.

Sears

h.

Bohm Allen

i.

K.G. Mens Store

j.

VISA - Salt Lake City, Utah.

k.

ZCMI

1.

Bank Loan

m.

Mervyns

8.

In the event the Defendnt does not pay the

obligations and debts as set. forth herein, then the amount that
Defendant agreed to pay, and did not pay will be deducted from
her share of the home equity prior to the payment thereof to
Defendant.
9.

The Defendant agrees to return all credit cards in

her possession for which the Plaintiff may be jointly liable.
10.

The parties agree and stipulate that as of December

20, 1984, the home payments were three months in arrears.

The

parties agree to divide equally the liability for those three

Page -3-
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months home payments and, in the event that one party or the
other has paid those payments, then the other party will
reimburse him or her for 50% of that amount*

In the event that

Plaintiff pays those three months home payments and the Defendant
fails to reimburse him for one-half of that amount, then that
amount will be deducted from the share of Defendant's home equity
of the parties.
11.

The parties agree to hold the other harmless as to

the debts and obligations assumed by that party in this
agreement.
12.

During the course of the marriage the parties have

acquired certin items of personal property which should be
divided between the parties as follows:
TO THE PLAINTIFF:
a.

All personal property brought into the

marriage.
b.

All gifts from the Defendant.

c.

Major household appliances including

washer/dryer and refrigerator.
d.

Fifty percent of the marriage gifts.

e.

Plaintiff's personal effects and clothing.

f.

The personal property presently located at the

home of the parties subject to those items designated to
belong to the Defendant hereafter.
TO THE DEFENDANT:
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a.

All personal property brought into the marriage

by Defendant.
b.

All gifts from the Plaintiff.

c.

Fifty percent of the marriage gifts.

d.

Defendant's personal property and clothing.

e.

Housekeeping items such as pots, pans, towels,

and sheets, etc., be agreement of the parties.
f.

The Defendant's gifts from her father including

antiques presently in the posBOHfilon of t h<> M n l n U r r .
13.

In addition to the personal property reforrud to

above, the Defendant shall be awarded the interest of the parties
in the 1984 Pontiac Fiero in possession of the Defendant subject
to any indebtedness thereon which Defendant shall pay and hold
the Plaintiff harmless thereon.
14.

The parties should be awarded his or her own

separate savings accounts, checking accounts, money market
accounts, credit union accounts and the like, if any, without any
claim by the other.
15.

Each party should be awarded his or her own

retirement, pension, or profit sharing plan, if any, free of any
claim by the other.
16.

Each party will pay his or her own attorney's fees

incurred in the bringing and prosectution of this matter or its
defense.
17.

This Agreement shall not be deemed a condonation by
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1(89

either party of the act or acts claimed by either party to have
caused the differences leading to the parties' separation,
18.

No modification or waiver of any of the terms of

this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the
party to be charged.

No waiver of any breach or default

hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or
default of the same or similar nature.
19.

Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate

with the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes
in title to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change
the names and responsibilities for payment on the charge accounts
and other way necessary to be proper to insure that the Agreement
entered into is carried out in every detail.
20.

In the event ether party to this Agreement defaults

in his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall
be liable to the other for all reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of the obligations
created by this Agreement.
21.

The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete

settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's
property whether presently existing or hereafter aquired.
22.

The above-named Defendant specifically stipulates

and acknowledges as follows:
a.

That the Defendant agrees to allow her default

to be entered on Plaintiff's Complaint subject to the

Pxav
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terms and provisions of this Settlement Agreement;
b.

That said Defendant understands that the court

may, for good cause shown, waive the ninety-daty waiting
period provided by Section 30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) and immediately hold a hearing upon the Complaint
and enter Judgment against said Defendant without further
notice and that said Defendnt consents to the same and,
in fact believes it to be in the best interest of the
parties to waive said period and requests the Court to
waive said period;
c.

That said Defendant further understands that the

Court may, for good cause shown, waive the three months
waiting period providing by Section 30-3-7 Utah Code
Annotated (1953) and order that the Decree may become
absolute upon entry and that, believing it to be in the
best interests of both parties, said Defendant further
requests the Court to waive the same;
d.

That Frederick N. Green, attorney for Plaintiff,

represents only the Plaintiff in this matter and does not
represent the Defendant for any purpose at any
e.

time; and

That the above acknowledgements and stipulations

are dependent upon and made in contemplation of the
parties aqreeing to and executing this Settlemebnt
Agreement and the same being approved by the Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their
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h a n d on t h i s

DATED this

2. ^

^r

7,Uli/

d a y of

day of

1985.
1985.

L2L(^U

7

"T
GREEN & BERRY

tEDERICK N. GREEN
attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the J?Stk
day of C ^ X ^
1985, before me, the
undersigned officer, personally7appeared Steven Bradley Dahl who
is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed
the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness whereof, I have Jiereunto set my hand and
official seal this JL?/£L day of C L ^ W
, 1985.
£.^-*}Sl>y

My commission expires
^ ^ c 7,

XZ7^~L'L^'^

Notary -Publ ic n
Residing ^ 11 v^i.xX^ c

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

PAUL L I A P I S
Attorney for

Defendant

CYNTHIA ,ZOR DAHL
STATR

OF

UTAH

7/&&
Pano - 8 -
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) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the ^^rdj
day of v ^ J L x ^
/ 1985, before me, the
undersigned officer, personally appeared Cynthia Zoe Dahl who is
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed
the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
official seal this CP 23ACQ d a v o f T)LJJJJ^
/ 1985.

t

My commission expires:

JK38

ye2o7
STATi O F urm
) ^
OOUNTY Of tALT LAKI ) ^
i, T H * UMDCfWGNEO, 0LE9K Of TH€ OBTWCT
OOUPCT Of 8A4.T LAK£ COUNTY, UTAH, DO HE3EEY
C^JTIfY THAT TH* AX**XED A*D *OKEGOtNG fc
A TWU€ AND P A L COO' Of AM Cfl'GINAL DOCUU&m OH RLE >N MY O f f ICC AS SUCH CLERK.
WTNS8S MY HAND AND SEAL Of SAJO OOURT
TH16 n? DAY Of
~>>V*.*^£*i^
16 S%
H. DWCON KINpLfY. O j i f l K
BPY
/
^^^<^
/L^^r
DEPUTY
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EXHIBIT "B"
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer
and Custodian of the DEFAULT
INDEMNITY FUND and the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION of UTAH,
Applicants,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

v.
REVLON SERVICE, INC.
and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY
Defendants.

D E A T H

B E N E F I T S

O R D E R

*
*
*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

WHEREAS, Steve Dahl was fatally injured as the result of an accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment with Revlon Service, Inc. on
August 2, 1985.
WHEREAS, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a), U. C. A., provides that if the
Commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of a
deceased employee, it may issue an Order for the employer or insurance carrier
to pay into the Default Indemnity Fund the sum of $30,000.00. In the event no
dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, this Order
shall become permanent and final, and
WHEREAS, the Commission has reasonably determined that there are no
dependents and desires to have the statutory amount herein above stated paid
into the Default Indemnity Fund, and further, the Commission is of the opinion
that the statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00 should also be paid,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants pay to the Default
Indemnity Fund, c/o Edward Alter, State Treasurer, the sum of $30,000.00 for
the use and benefit of the Default Indemnity Fund.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claim made by undetermined or potential
dependents of the deceased must be made within one year from the date of death
or the funds herein ordered paid to the Default Indemnity Fund shall become
the property of the Default Indemnity Fund without further order of the
Commission.
IT IS
allowance.

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

the

defendants

pay

the

statutory

funeral
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STEVE DAHL, Deceased
DEATH BENEFITS ORDER
PAGE TWO

Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman

Walter T. Axelgard, Commissioner

L. L. Nielsen, Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of UtaJ*, Salt Lakp qity. Utah this
.fy^
day of /h%m/J&r^
1985.

ATTEST:

Linda J.
Commissi

83074

isburg
'Secretary
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EXHIBIT "C"
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85001103

CYNTHIA DAHL, widow of
STEVE DAHL,
deceased,
Applicant,
vs.
REVLON SERVICE, INCORPORATED and/or
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE and/or
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 12,
1986, at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Frank J.
Gustin, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants, Revlon Service, Incorporated and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance, were represented by Tracy
Birdsong, Adjustor.
The Default Indemnity
Pixton, Administrator.

Fund

was

represented

by Suzan

On September 3, 1985, the Commission entered a Death Benefits Order
finding that there were no dependents of the deceased at the time of his
death, and that the sum of $30,000.00 should be paid into the Default
Indemnity Fund. On December 12, 1985, the Applicant filed an Application for
Death Benefits, indicating that she was the surviving spouse of the deceased
and as such, entitled to death benefits. A Hearing was held in the matter and
being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared
to enter the following:

0
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Applicant herein, Cynthia Dahl, married Steve Dahl in October of
1978 in Denver, Colorado. At that time, the deceased was not employed but did
secure employment a few months after the marriage.
At the time of the
marriage, the Applicant was working as a Flight Attendant with Frontier
Airlines. In September of 1979, the Applicant and the deceased moved to Salt
Lake City and bought a home in Sandy.
On February 6, 1984, the decedent had a heart attack and following
the same, his attitude changed towards his wife. She testified that he became
more of a "workaholic" after his heart attack and that they no longer had a
sex life following his heart attack, which she attributed to his medication.
The deceased also advised Mrs. Dahl that he did not want to have children and
they no longer did things together or socialized.
In November of 1984, the
Applicant left the marital home, which was in a joint tenancy and moved to the
Denver area, where she moved in with a co-worker. The Applicant left her car
in Salt Lake City but took all of her clothes with her. She testified that
she talked on the phone with the decedent and that when he was in Denver, they
would have dinner or breakfast together.
She testified that she felt they
were still making efforts towards reconciliation and that as a result, she was
shocked when in January of 1985, Mr. Dahl filed a complaint of divorce against
her, alleging mental cruelty.
Prior to the filing of the complaint of
divorce, the Applicant sent $200.00 a month to the deceased for the months of
November and December of 1984 and January of 1985 for payment of their joint
obligations incurred during the marriage. Following the filing of the divorce
complaint and after she had retained legal counsel, the Applicant made no
further payments to the deceased.
In March of 1985, Applicant, by and through counsel, filed a Motion
for an Order to Show Cause, regarding temporary support and other related
matters and at that time, the Applicant was seeking temporary support in the
amount of $750.00 per month.
In reviewing that Motion in light of the
Applicant's
testimony
at
the
time
of
the
evidentiary
hearing,
the
Administrative Law Judge has serious doubts about the truthfulness and
accuracy of that document.
For example, at the time of the Hearing, the
Applicant testified under oath that she was paying her roommate in Denver rent
of $200.00 per month.
However, in the Motion she represents that she was
paying $300.00 per month. The Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that
the Motion and the expenses contained therein were "padded" for the purpose of
leverage during the litigation.
Following the filing of the Motion, the
counsel for the parties then had several communications and the Motion was
never heard by the District Court because the parties, for all intents and
purposes, had placed the case in a posture of eventual settlement.
Thereafter, the Applicant instructed her attorney to prepare a
Separation Agreement and Stipulated Property Settlement to settle the matter.
Her attorney did so and submitted that Agreement to the other party.
It is
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interesting to note in that Agreement that the Applicant had waived the 90 day
waiting period as provided by law, contrary to her testimony that she was
still actively engaged in reconciliation with the deceased. If this had truly
been the case, then it would seem that she would not have waived that period,
since the intent of the Legislature in enacting the waiting period provision
is for the very purpose of allowing parties the opportunity to reconcile.
That stipulation of the Applicants also provided that the deceased would
retain possession of the family home for the purpose of selling the same and
then the proceeds from the sale would be divided equally between the parties,
with the Applicant's attorney indicating that, by his calculations, she would
have received $2,500.00 as her share of the equity in the family home. The
Agreement went on to provide that each party would pay their own debts and the
Applicant would keep her car and pay the indebtedness thereon, even though it
was a joint obligation.
The most telling provision in the Applicant's
Agreement was her waiving of any alimony whatsoever. The Applicant testified
that she did not like the terms of the stipulation, although the same had been
prepared at her direction and she was still not desirous of the divorce.
In response to her stipulation, the deceased had his attorney prepare
a Property Settlement and Separation Agreement. That Agreement provided that
the deceased would retain possession of the home, for the purpose of selling
the same, and that he would make one half of the payment for the 3 month
arrearages and that the Applicant would make the other half and in the event
that either of the parties paid the full payments, then they would reimburse
the other party for their half of that amount. The parties also agreed that
each party would be responsible for their own separate credit cards and other
obligations and Applicant was to return any joint credit cards in her
possession.
With respect to the joint obligations of the parties incurred
during the marriage, each party was liable for one half of those debts. The
Agreement also provided that in the event either party did not pay their share
of the marital obligations, then that amount could be deducted from that
partie's share of the equity from the home. The stipulation also divided the
personal property of the parties and again the Applicant waived any and all
right to the alimony whatsoever. Finally, the 90-day waiting period was also
waived and the Applicant agreed that her default could be entered at any time
in the matter. This Property Settlement and Separation Agreement was sent to
the Applicant and her attorney in April of 1985.
In July of 1985, the deceased contacted the Applicant and informed
her that he still wanted the divorce and that unless she signed the Property
Settlement and Separation Agreement, he would contact his attorney and have a
trial date set for the purpose of litigating the divorce.
The Applicant
executed the Agreement in the presence of a Notary Public on July 23, 1985,
and returned it to the deceased. The deceased and his attorney then executed
the Agreement on July 26, 1985, and it was subsequently filed with the court
on August 5, 1985. The deceased met his demise on August 2, 1985. As a
result of his demise, the Applicant, by and through counsel, now argues that
the Property Settlement and Separation Agreement she executed on July 23, 1985,
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is totally worthless and without any legal effect whatsoever.
The Applicant, in seeking to recover benefits as the surviving
spouse, places reliance on the Supreme Court case of Donita Tuom vs. Duane
Hall Trucking. 675 P2d 1200 (Utah 1984). In reviewing the fact of that case,
the Administrative Law Judge notes a very important distinguishing factor
between the Tuom case and the instant case at bar. In Tuom, the deceased and
his wife had separated in June of 1980, after contracting a common law
marriage in Idaho in 19 71. The deceased moved in with another woman but
continued to maintain at least monthly telephone contact with the wife and he
paid her three lump sum payments and allowed her the use of a truck. However,
the important feature of the Tuom case is that "neither took any formal steps
to terminate their marriage relationship.** By comparison, the deceased took
the formal step of filing a complaint for divorce against the Applicant for
mental cruelty and the Applicant retained counsel and instructed her counsel
to prepare a Motion for Temporary Support and a Stipulated Property
Settlement. Accordingly, rather than showing some intent to reconcile, the
parties in this case, by their actions, evidenced the exact opposite.
Although the Applicant testified that she felt they were making efforts
towards reconciliation, it is clear to the Administrative Law Judge that her
actions belie this fact and, further, the Administrative Law Judge does not
believe her self-serving testimony in this regard.
Pursuant to the Tuom case, the Applicant, in order to be entitled to
benefits, must prove that she was dependent either in whole or in part on
support from the deceased. The evidence on the file does not support the
Applicant's contention. Rather first, the Applicant must prove that she was
relying on her husband for her support. The evidence on the file does not
support this contention.
Rather, for the first three months of her
separation, the Applicant was supporting the deceased, by sending him payments
of $200.00 per month to help with the joint obligations of the parties
incurred during the marriage. After the deceased filed his complaint of
divorce and after the Applicant retained legal counsel, she then terminated
these support payments, if you will, and then counter-claimed for monthly
support of $750.00. Other than this one Motion for Temporary Support, this is
the only reference in the file whatsoever to any desire of the Applicant to
receive support.
A closer reading of the file will indicate that the
Applicant, in her Stipulation did not request any support whatsoever, in fact,
she waived alimony forever. Further, in the Stipulation that she signed on
July 23, 1985, she agreed that she was not entitled to any alimony ever. But
for the death of the deceased, the Applicant would have been divorced from Mr.
Dahl and would have been entitled to take nothing. Therefore, it cannot be
said that Mrs. Dahl had any type of reasonable expectation of support from the
deceased, rather, she quite clearly
agreed that she would not have any
expectation of support, by waiving her alimony, which is support.
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Finally, the deceased was not providing financial aid to Mrs. Dahl to
support her in her lifestyle. Rather, the parties after negotiations with the
benefit of legal counsel arrived at a Property Settlement and Separation
Agreement, whereby the parties settled their joint obligations and their
separate obligations.
Each party agreed to pay those bills that they had
incurred and they further agreed that each would be liable for one half of the
obligations that had been incurred during the marriage. In other words, Mrs.
Dahl assumed liability for her own debts as did Mr. Dahl.
There was no
agreement for support, because Mrs. Dahl was not claiming any support. During
1984, Mrs. Dahl worked 10 months and earned $20,000.00. In 1985, Mrs. Dahl
worked 9 months and earned $20,000.00 and had she worked the rest of the year,
it is fair to interpolate that she would have made $29,000.00. Income at this
level was sufficient to support the Applicant.
In fact, she lived on her
income while she was in the Denver area and there was no evidence the deceased
was paying her ongoing expenses. As indicated earlier, the Administrative Law
Judge does not believe the figures set forth in the Motion for Temporary
Support which are said to represent the Applicant's expenses.
To summarize then, the Applicant and the deceased entered into an
Agreement whereby each was to pay his own obligations and one half of the
joint and several obligations of the parties incurred during the marriage.
For the Applicant to characterize the Agreement as one of support, is to
ignore the obvious intent of the parties as evidenced by their Agreement of
July 23, 1985. That intent was that the parties were to be divorced and Mrs.
Dahl would not be entitled to any support and neither would Mr. Dahl.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
At the time of his death, Steve Dahl was not living with Cynthia Dahl
nor was he supporting her.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of September 3, 1985, awarding
no dependent death benefits to the Default Indemnity Fund should be and the
same is hereby reaffirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim of Cynthia Dahl for dependent's
benefits should be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

179

•J U

I /

CYNTHIA DAHL
ORDER
PAGE SIX

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or ft^g^al.

^
i_
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
/ 7^^a y of March, 1986.

I

/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on March
/ 7^
1986, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the case of Cynthia Dahl
issued March
//^
1986, was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:
Cynthia Dahl, 11551 South Hidden Valley Blvd, Sandy, UT 84092
Frank J. Gustin, Atty., 48 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor
SLC, UT 84101
Liberty Mutual Insurance, Box 45440, SLC, UT 84145-00440
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Revlon Service, Incorporated, 767 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y.
10153

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By ---Z^W^^
Carol Olson
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EXHIBIT "D"
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

A

CASE No,85001103

CYNTHIA DAHL, Widow of,
STEVE DAHL, Deceased,
Applicant,
vs.
REVLON SERVICE, Inc. and/or
LIBERTY MUTUAL and/or
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On March 17, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order denying the
widow/applicant in the above captioned case dependency death benefits. The
Administrative Law Judge determined no benefits were due as the conclusive
presumption regarding dependency was not applicable, and because there was
insufficient evidence to show the widow/applicant was dependent on the
deceased husband. On March 26, 1986, the attorney for the applicant filed a
Motion for Review claiming the Administrative Law Judge had emphasized certain
unreliable evidence, and ignored other evidence showing dependency in arriving
at his decision. The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law
Judge correctly found no dependency death benefits were due the applicant.
The attorney for the applicant initially set forth argument that
dependency benefits should be awarded in a pre-hearing memorandum of points
and
authorities.
In
that memorandum,
the counsel
for the applicant
acknowledges that the two statutory provisions governing the determination of
dependency are U.C.A. 35-1-68 and U.C.A. 35-1-71. The attorney concludes that
the Utah Supreme Court case Tuom vs. Duane Hall Trucking. 675 P.2d 1200 (Utah
1984) requires that the two above cited statutory sections must be read
together so that the result is that a conclusive presumption of dependency is
appropriate only where the marital partners were living together at the time
of death. This, the attorney for the applicant concedes, was not the case in
the instant matter, as the widow/applicant had left the marital residence in
Salt Lake City, Utah approximately one year prior to her husband's death in
August 1985. Conceding the inapplicability of the conclusive presumption of
dependency, the attorney for the applicant maintained that this did not
prevent a finding that the Applicant was dependent on her husband, as other
evidence existed to show dependency.
The counsel for the applicant stated
that the applicant originally sought a Court Order requiring the husband to
provide her with certain support during the pendency of the divorce, but later
agreed to settle for the husband's assumption of the mortgage and other debt
payments which were the joint responsibility of the widow/applicant and her
husband.
This, the attorney for the applicant maintains, shows that the
applicant was dependent on her husband at the time of his death.
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CYNTHIA DAHL, Widow of
STEVE DAHL, Deceased
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW
PAGE TWO

In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order, the Administrative Law Judge finds the above referenced
evidence of dependency insufficient in light of the other surrounding
circumstances. The Administrative Law Judge lists five separate reasons why
he could not find that the widow/applicant was dependent on the husband.
First, the Administrative Law Judge notes that the applicant sent her husband
$200.00 per month for the first three months of the couple's separation in
order to assist her husband in the mortgage and other debt payments for which
the two had joint liability. The Administrative Law Judge notes that these
payments were stopped once the husband filed for divorce, but that there was
no evidence she was financially incapable of continuing to make the payments.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the fact that the widow/applicant
voluntarily made these payments is not consistent with a finding that she was
dependent on the husband to whom she made the payments.
Second, the
Administrative Law Judge notes that the proposed Motion for temporary support,
prepared by the applicant and her attorney prior to the divorce trial,
contained a list of the applicant's monthly expenses which was in conflict
with certain testimony the applicant gave at the Industrial Commission
hearing. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found that the written list
of monthly expenses in that proposal was not reliable evidence that the
applicant was, in fact, dependent on her husband during the separation.
Third, the Administrative Law Judge refers to the two proposed divorce
settlement agreements prepared respectively by counsel for the applicant and
counsel for the husband.
The Administrative Law Judge states that the two
proposals both suggest settlement based on a more or less even distribution of
property as well as an even distribution of the jointly incurred debt. The
Administrative Law Judge maintains this demonstrates neither spouse was
dependent on the other. Fourth, the Administrative Law Judge notes that there
is no evidence in the proposed
settlement agreements or other divorce
proceedings that the Applicant ever sought alimony as she predictably would
have
if
she
felt
herself
dependent
on her
husband.
Finally,
the
Administrative Law Judge notes that at the time of the separation, the
Applicant was employed in the same job she had since her marriage, which job
paid upwards of $20,000.00 per year.
In the Applicant's March 26, 1986 Motion for Review, the counsel for
the Applicant argues that the Administrative Law Judge placed unwarranted
emphasis on the proposed settlement agreements prepared by the couple's
respective counsel.
Counsel for the applicant states the agreements were
never actually entered into, and had been set aside as it was determined a
trial would be necessary to finalize distribution of the property and debt.
Counsel for the Applicant states the Administrative Law Judge failed to take
proper notice of the fact the applicant and her husband had agreed the husband
would pay for the jointly incurred obligations during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings. Finally, counsel for the applicant emphasizes that the
applicant was not in a position where she could afford to pay off her share of
the jointly incurred debt without assistance. The counsel for the Applicant
argues that this is sufficient to show dependency per the Utah Supreme Court
case Farnsworth vs. The Industrial Commission, 534 P. 2d 807 (Utah 1975) and
that the applicant need not show she could not pay her living expenses in
order to show dependency.
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The Commission finds that, notwithstanding the fact that the proposed
settlement agreements were not entered into, the proposed agreements do
reflect that the two parties felt one was not dependent on the other, in that
both agreed to a more or less equal distribution of the jointly incurred
debt.
The Applicant's substantial income, and the fact that she lived and
maintained herself independently during nearly one year of separation, is also
indication that the applicant was not dependent on the husband.
Most
significant is the fact the applicant voluntarily paid her share of the
jointly incurred debt during separation up until the divorce suit was filed.
The Commission finds that all of these factors point to no dependency on the
part of the applicant, and the Commission therefore finds the Administrative
Law Judge correctly denied dependency death benefits.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's March 26, 1986, Motion
for Review, is hereby denied and the Administrative Law Judge's March 17, 1986
order is hereby affirmed and final.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

Walter Axelgard
Commissioner

//

Len io<_Nije 1 sen
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
o f U U h , Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of May, 1986
ATTEST:

* Linda J. Straiburg
Commission/Secretary
1/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on May 22 , 1986 a copy of the attached Denial of
Motion For Review was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

Cynthia Dahl, 11551 South Hidden Valley Blvd., Sandy, Utah

84092

Frank J. Gustin, Attorney, 48 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101
Liberty Mutual Insurance, Box 45440, Salt Lake City, Utah
Revlon Service, Inc., 767

84145-0440

5th Avenue, New York, New York, 10153

Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

Barbara

